An Introduction to Formal Logic (Peter Smith)
A 420-page textbook on classical first-order quantification theory, written for first-year philosophy undergraduates by a Cambridge logician, now freely available as a self-published PDF. The book builds from the most basic distinctions (validity vs. soundness, deduction vs. induction) through propositional logic to quantified logic with identity, using a Fitch-style natural deduction system. It is unusually rigorous about why formal logic works — the metatheory is treated seriously, not deferred.
What It Covers
The book has three major arcs, each prefaced by an "Interlude" that motivates the transition:
-
Informal logic (Chapters 1–7): Validity, soundness, inference forms, the counterexample method, and the move from informal argument patterns to formal schemas. The key distinction: validity is about whether truth of premises guarantees truth of conclusion; soundness adds that the premises are actually true.
-
Propositional logic — PL (Chapters 8–24): Truth-functional connectives, syntax and semantics, truth tables, tautological entailment, expressive adequacy, and a Fitch-style natural deduction proof system for PL. Includes metatheory: soundness and completeness of the PL proof system.
-
Quantificational logic — QL (Chapters 25–42): Names and predicates, quantifier-variable notation, formal QL languages, translations from English, and a natural deduction proof system for QL extended with identity (QL=). Covers definite descriptions and functions.
An appendix sketches the soundness and completeness proofs for QL.
Pedagogical Approach
Smith takes a "slow-then-accelerate" approach — the first fifty pages are informal argument analysis before any logical symbols appear. He justifies this explicitly: students need to understand what formal logic is for before they can appreciate how it works.
The book's real strength is metatheoretic honesty. Unlike many introductory texts that treat the proof system as a black box, Smith names the gap between "these rules seem right" and "these rules are provably complete." Even if he only sketches the completeness proof, he makes clear that there is a proof to be had, and why it matters.
The writing is conversational but precise. Smith acknowledges tradeoffs openly — the preface admits no text will please everyone and explicitly invites reader feedback for a planned third edition.
Key Concepts
-
Deductive validity: An inference is valid iff there is no possible situation where premises are true and conclusion false. The notion of "possible" here is the weakest, most inclusive sense — not physical possibility, but logical coherence.
-
Logical form: Arguments share inferential patterns. Schemas (with recurring symbols indicating where substitutions must be uniform) are the tool for revealing those patterns. No argument has a unique form — there is only the most general reliable form it instantiates.
-
Truth-functionality: The connectives of propositional logic are truth-functional — the truth-value of a compound sentence is determined entirely by the truth-values of its components. This is what makes mechanical decision procedures possible.
-
Expressive adequacy: A set of connectives is expressively adequate if every truth-function can be expressed using only those connectives. The standard set {¬, ∧, ∨, →} is adequate; so are {¬, ∧} and {¬, ∨}. The Sheffer stroke (NAND) is adequate all by itself.
Sharp Takes
The "just teach them truth tables and move on" approach is intellectually dishonest. Smith dedicates an entire chapter (Chapter 19: "If's and →'s") to the mismatch between the truth-functional conditional and the English "if/then", refusing to paper over it with hand-waving. This is the right call — students who learn the material conditional without understanding its limitations become the programmers who confuse logical implication with causal reasoning.
The tree-vs.-deduction debate is a proxy war about pedagogical values. The first edition used semantic tableaux (truth trees); the second switched to Fitch-style natural deduction after "many looking for a course text complained." Smith's ideal third edition would cover both, letting instructors choose. The real question: should students first learn to find counterexamples (trees) or construct proofs (deduction)? Smith's answer — both, eventually — is correct and almost nobody does it.
The interlude chapters are the book's secret weapon. Rather than lurch from topic to topic, Smith inserts short "Interlude" chapters that explain why the next formal apparatus is needed. This meta-commentary — explaining the motivation before presenting the machinery — is what separates a textbook from a reference.
Classical first-order logic is treated as a "permanent achievement," not a stepping stone to something fancier. Smith is unapologetic about this. Non-classical logics, modal logic, many-valued logic — none appear. The bet is that mastering one system deeply beats surveying many superficially. For a first course, this is clearly right.
Relevance to AI and Software
The connection is indirect but real. Formal logic is the intellectual ancestor of: - Type systems and program verification (the Curry-Howard correspondence) - SAT solvers and SMT (built on propositional and first-order logic) - Database query languages (SQL is first-order logic in disguise) - Model checking and formal specification - The very notion of a "specification" as a logical formula a program must satisfy
Smith's book doesn't draw these connections — it's a philosophy textbook, not a CS one. But the discipline of distinguishing syntax from semantics, understanding what a formal proof actually guarantees, and reasoning about the limits of formal systems is directly relevant to anyone building systems that must be correct by construction. See We Have Proof Automation Now for the modern extension, Notes on Structured Programming for Dijkstra's application of logical reasoning to code, and Accordant for model-based testing as executable specifications.
Sources: raw/introduction-to-formal-logic-smith Last updated: 2026-07-29